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)
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)
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)
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)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' January 17, 2014
opinion in which the Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the
restitution order entered against Kristi Hurles.

State v. Hurles, Docket No.

39219, 2014 Opinion No. 3 (Idaho App., January 17, 2014) (hereinafter
"Opinion").

Review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion is appropriate because it

presents an issue not heretofore addressed by this Court regarding (1) the
proper application of the principle stated in Zichko, that. .. ; and (,:,..,_~~~~t--::::::-::::::-::::~1·

1

Fil[D .. COPY
MAR I 8 2014

For the Court's convenience, a copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion is attached
hereto as Appendix A

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings In District Court
Hurles worked at the Crescent "No Lawyers" Bar and Grill ("Crescent").
(PSI, p.2. 1) Following an investigation into why the Crescent was losing money
in its lottery account, it was discovered that the "payouts" while Hurles was
working were above average. (PSI, pp.2-3.) A separate investigation into profit
loss for ATM use also implicated Hurles.

(PSI, p.3.)

When contacted by a

detective with the Boise Police Department, Hurles initially denied taking any
money, but later admitted doing so "because her husband had lost his job. "2
(PSI, pp.3-4.)
The state charged Hurles with two counts of grand theft. (R, pp.28-29.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hurles pied guilty to one count and the state
agreed to dismiss the other count and recommend a unified 14-year sentence
with two years fixed.

(2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, L.13 - p.2, L.17 (terms of plea

agreement), pp.4-8 (entry of plea).) The terms of the agreement also provided
that the state would request "restitution on all DRs that were disclosed in
discovery" and the dismissed charge. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22, p.8, Ls.1517.)

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"HurlesPSl.pdf."
2

Hurles' admission was limited to the ATM-related thefts; she "adamantly denied
ever taking any money from the lottery." (PSI, p.4.)
2

Because Hurles disputed the amount of restitution owed to Butch and
Jody Morrison, the owners of the Crescent, the court conducted two restitution
hearings.
Tr.)

(2/17/2011 Tr., pp.15-19; see generally 5/19/2011 Tr. and 8/4/2011

On cross-examination at the initial restitution hearing, defense counsel

asked Jody if her accountant was James Warr. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, Ls.24-25.)
Jody testified that Mr. Warr was no longer their accountant, but was at one time.
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.63, Ls.1-4.)

Counsel then attempted to hand Jody some

documents that he apparently obtained from Mr. Warr and asked Jody whether
she or her husband ever "borrowed" money from the ATM. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.63,
Ls.11-18, p.67, L.16 - p.68, L.7; see also p.77, Ls.20-23).) Jody denied that she
or her husband ever did so and testified that, at one point, she actually funded
the ATM "to the tune of $4,000" using her own money. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.67, L.18
- p.68, L.12.)

Counsel also asked Jody:

"Didn't your accountant actually

confront you with the checks signed and endorsed by Butch, and you denied it
for five months?" (5/19/2011 Tr., p.69, Ls.22-25.) Jody denied this was true.
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.69, L.25.) Jody also explained that she had reports from her
"then-accountant," Mr. Warr, showing an "imbalance in the credits and the debits
of the ATM of checks written to the ATM." (5/19/2011 Tr., p. 72, Ls.2-5.)
Defense counsel also inquired into the existence of any "record of cash
sales during this time period." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.19-20.) Jody answered: "I have
records of them. I have -- we have daily cash recordings that we do every day.
We have a monthly spreadsheet that is provided to my accountant." (5/19/2011
Tr., p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.1.) Defense counsel then advised the court it was "going
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to hear from the accountant" that "we just don't have the records to establish" the
claimed loss. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.79, Ls.20-25.) Defense counsel further indicated
he had met with the accountant who was "prepared to testify." (5/19/2011 Tr.,
p.80, Ls.16-19.)

Due to time constraints, the court continued the restitution

hearing. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.80, Ls.1-12.)
At the second hearing, Hurles called Mr. Warr as a witness.

Following

limited testimony by Mr. Warr regarding the nature of his relationship with the
Morrisons and Crescent, the Morrisons asserted their accountant-client privilege.
(8//4/2011 Tr., p.10, L.19- p.12, L.12.) Hurles responded that the privilege was
waived because the Morrisons had filed a lawsuit against Mr. Warr, which
allowed him to "now defend himself." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-18.) The court
agreed there was a privilege but found the exception proffered by Hurles did not
apply in the context of the restitution matter. (8/4/2011 Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.14,
L.24.) Defense counsel responded that, in the event Mr. Warr could not testify,
he would like additional time to find another accountant "to review this
information." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.15, L.5, p.16, Ls.2-5.) Although the
court granted the request for additional time to consult an accountant, defense
counsel complained: "even hiring a CPA is not going to be able to get us the
admissions made by the alleged victims in this case, which is really what we
needed from Mr. Warr anyway." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.22-23, p.22, Ls.7-10.)
Nevertheless, Hurles asked for and received an additional week. (8/4/2011 Tr.,
p.22, Ls.10-12, p.24, Ls.15-19.)
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At the final hearing, Hurles did not have a witness or additional evidence
regarding restitution but instead revisited the issue of whether the accountantclient privilege had been waived.

(8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, L.13

p.96, L.10.)

Defense counsel argued that, although he had not had the opportunity to review
the original restitution hearing, his recollection was that Jody testified "in either
direct or on cross examination, about conversations she had with her accountant"
and contended that by doing so she waived the privilege such that Hurles should
be allowed to call Mr. Warr to impeach Jody.

(8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, Ls.18-21,

p.96, Ls.5-16.) Defense counsel also asserted he asked Jody "questions about
transactions that took place after Ms. Hurles was released from the Crescent"
and explained "[t]hat's a pretty significant portion of what [he] wanted the
accountant" to testify about. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.96, L.22 - p.97, L.7.) The court
responded:
Okay. This is what we are going to do. I'm going to go
ahead and sentence her today. I'm going to order the restitution
that's been proved to me at this point. I will give you 30 days in
which to come in and move for reconsideration if you think that's
inappropriate and try - and to prove to me that the . . .
accountant/client relationship has been breached and that you are
entitled, then, to bring the accountant in.

You're going to have to do some research on that. And
you're going to have to go back and listen to the original - the first
restitution hearing in which the victim testified. And so we need to
specifically know what it is that she said in relationship to her
accountant to determine whether or not there was waiver.
So it may require that you get a transcript of at least that part
of the conversation. You wouldn't have to get one of the entire -her entire testimony, but that part of it. So you may have to do that
in your motion -- if you want to file a motion to reconsider.
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Looks to me like the only thing that - that stands between
the restitution figure being requested and the client paying that
amount is potentially whether or not the - you can impeach the
victim through the accountant.
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.99, L.1.)
Defense counsel agreed to the court's proposed course of action and
agreed with the court's statement that the "only thing" standing "between the
restitution figure being requested and [Hurles] paying that amount" was whether
Jody could be impeached by the accountant. 3 (8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, L.8, p.99,
Ls.2-4.) The court thereafter ordered restitution in the amount of $204,174.61,
and Hurles never followed-up on the court's invitation to establish that Jody
Morrison waived the accountant-client privilege. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.103, Ls.11-12;
R., pp.71-72; see R., pp.3-4 (ROA reflecting no motion to reconsider ever filed).)

In addition to its restitution order, the court also entered judgment,
imposing a unified 14-year sentence with two years fixed. (R., pp.67-69.) Hurles
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R, pp.73-75.)

Course Of Proceedings On Appeal
On appeal, Hurles raised three issues: (1) whether the district court erred
in concluding the Morrisons did not implicitly waive the accountant-client
privilege; (2) whether the court's restitution award was supported by substantial

3

When asked how he "gain[ed] knowledge that the accountant may have
information that would be impeaching," defense counsel indicated he talked to
Mr. Warr because he was originally subpoenaed by the state but defense
counsel declined to provide any additional information regarding the nature of his
discussion with Mr. Warr. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.99, Ls.5-25; see also 8/4/2011 Tr.,
p.15, Ls.22-24 (defense counsel stated at the prior hearing: "I don't want to do
anything to hurt Mr. Warr or myself. I don't want to disclose anything.")
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competent evidence; and (3) whether the court abused its discretion by including
civil attorneys' fees in its restitution award. 4 (Appellant's Brief, p 9.)
With respect to the privilege issue, Hurles argued the privilege was waived
when (1) the Morrisons "relied on Mr. Warr's documents to establish the amount
of restitution"; (2) Judy Morrison "deci[ded) to testify as to the contents of her
conversations with Mr. Warr"; and (3) "when the prosecutor consented to allow
defense counsel to discuss the amount of restitution with Mr. Warr." (Appellant's
Brief, p.10.) Hurles also argued Mr. Warr's "testimony is necessary because it is
the only means by which the district court and Ms. Hurles could get an accurate
restitution estimate" and it is "necessary to impeach Ms. Morrison." (Appellant's
Brief, pp.19-20.)
In response, the state first asserted that the Court should not consider
Hurles' arguments regarding waiver because despite the opportunity to establish
that Jody Morrison waived the accountant-client privilege, Hurles never followedup on the court's invitation to do so.

Thus, Hurles never afforded the district

court the opportunity to make an informed ruling on whether the privilege had
been waived.

See State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296

(1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993))
(appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal unless the
record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of
error'").

The state is not seeking review of the Court of Appeals' resolution of this third
issue; therefore, the merits of that claim will not be addressed in this brief.
Should this Court grant review, the state relies on its prior brief for argument on
this issue. (Brief of Respondent, pp.26-32.)
4
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The Court of Appeals rejected the state's preservation argument, stating:
The court's application of the privilege and exclusion of the
accountant creates the adverse ruling that Hurles can appeal from.
Cf. State v. lwakiri, 106 Idaho 618,621,682 P.2d 571, 574 (1984)
(reviewing, on appeal, the trial court's ruling that the attorney-client
privilege was waived, which allowed the attorney to testify at trial).
The fact that Hurles' defense attorney did not file a motion to
reconsider, as suggested by the trial court, does not translate to
abandonment of the privilege waiver claim. The State's argument
to the contrary cites no legal authority for its position that Hurles
was required to move the district court to reconsider its decision to
exclude the accountant in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
Without legal authority, the State has waived the argument, and we
need not consider it. Idaho Appellate Rule 35; State v. Zichko, 129
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).
(Opinion, pp.7-8.)
In addition to the preservation issue, the state also addressed Hurles'
specific arguments relating to waiver. (Brief of Respondent, pp.9-16.) The Court
of Appeals ultimately determined:
Considering that the accountant's information recited to the police
directly dealt with the embezzlement losses, we must reverse the
restitution order as to the award of restitution for embezzlement
losses and remand to the district court so that Hurles may pursue
the accountant's testimony. On remand, the district court may have
to address the applicability of the accountant-client privilege to
other testimony by the accountant, an issue on which we do not
express an opinion.
(Opinion, p.8.)
Regarding the actual restitution award, Hurles claimed the award was not
supported by substantial and competent evidence because, she argued, it
included checks endorsed by the Morrisons, it did not factor in Hurles' claim that
she "was only keeping between ten and twenty percent of the checks," and the
restitution award includes losses outside the time period to which she pied guilty.
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(Appellant's Brief, p.21.)

With respect to this latter argument, the state noted

Hurles' failure to acknowledge that the plea agreement allowed the state to seek
restitution "on all DRs that were disclosed in discovery." (Brief of Respondent,
p.24 (quoting 2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-21).) In reply, Hurles argued: (1) "[t]he
mere fact that the State is going to seek restitution for certain amounts does not
mean that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for those amounts," and
(2) the "term 'DRs' is ambiguous because it is not defined anywhere in the
record" and the ambiguity must be resolved in her favor.

(Reply Brief, pp. 7-8

(emphasis original).) The Court of Appeals agreed with Hurles. (Opinion, pp.11
13.)
The state filed a timely petition for review.
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ISSUE ON REVIEW
Is review proper because the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary
to precedent from this Court regarding (1) the proper interpretation of criminal
plea agreements, (2) the application of fundamental error to claims raised for the
first time on appeal in relation to plea agreements, (3) the requirement that an
issue must be presented to the district court before it will be considered on
appeal and whether State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 529, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), should
be used to relieve an appellant of her burden to preserve an issue? Additionally,
is review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion appropriate because the Court of
Appeals considered an issue not heretofore addressed by this Court regarding
what constitutes a waiver of the accountant-client privilege?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Review Is Appropriate Because The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Is Contrary
To Idaho Supreme Court Precedent And Is Inconsistent With The Correct
Interpretation Of Plea Agreements Under Both Contract Law And The
Fundamental Error Standard Of Review

A

Introduction
The state originally charged Hurles with two counts of grand theft.

The

first count alleged that, between December 30, 2008, and December 31, 2009,
Hurles wrongfully took in excess of $1,000.00 "from the pull tab profits from the
owner." (R., p.29.) The second count alleged that, between the same dates,
Hurles wrongfully took in excess of $1,000.00 "from the ATM profits" of Crescent.
(R., p.29.) Pursuant to an agreement, Hurles pied guilty to Count II and the state
agreed to dismiss Count I.

(2/17/2011 Tr., p.3, Ls.5-14.) The plea agreement

also allowed the state to seek restitution "on all DRs that were disclosed in
discovery." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-21.)

In stating this term, the prosecutor

further advised the court: "I have a list of those right here, but I think defense
counsel understands the ones we're talking about." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.2324.) Defense counsel responded: "I do, Your Honor." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.2325.)

The state also later noted, without objection, that the restitution would

"include the dismissed charge as well." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.16-17.)
Prior to sentencing, which occurred after the restitution hearing, the court
also reiterated the terms of the agreement as to restitution, stating: "You are to
pay restitution on all incidences, not simply the one grand theft charge, but the
entire time that you were there working for the employer and any thefts that may
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have occurred. So restitution was to cover all of that." (8/11/2011 Tr., p.103,
Ls.18-23.)
Ls.1-3.)

Hurles agreed that was her understanding.

(8/11/2011 Tr., p.104,

Hurles' acknowledgement was also consistent with the restitution

proceedings and the lack of any objection to the amounts requested or reflected
in State's Exhibit 1 as being beyond the scope of the charging document or the
terms of the plea agreement. (See generally 5/19/2011 Tr.)
On appeal, Hurles argued, in part, "that I.C. §19-5304 only allows the
district court to award restitution for the alleged thefts that occurred from
December of 2008 to December of 2009, and any restitution which was based on
thefts which occurred outside of that period should not have been included in the
restitution order."

(Appellant's Brief, p.27.)

When confronted with the plea

agreement, Hurles argued the state's ability to seek restitution did not mean she
agreed to pay it and she asserted the term "DRs" is "ambiguous" and should be
construed in her favor. (Reply Brief, pp.7-8.) The Court of Appeals reversed on
these same theories.
Review of this issue is appropriate because (1) the Court of Appeals
completely disregarded the entire purpose of the restitution term, and (2) whether
the Court of Appeals knows what the term "DR" means is irrelevant to whether
the parties who negotiated the plea agreement understood the term and any
ambiguity in the term prevents Hurles from meeting her burden of showing
fundamental error.
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B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, "this Court gives serious

consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the
decision of the lower court." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207,207 P.3d 182,
183 (2009) (quotations and citation omitted).

Heading

C.

Idaho Code § 19-5304(9) provides: "The court may, with the consent of
the parties, order restitution to victims ... for economic loss or injury for crimes
which are not adjudicated or are not before the court." The plea agreement in
this case clearly contemplated an award of restitution for crimes that were not
adjudicated - including "all DRs that were disclosed in discovery," which defense
counsel had a list of, and the dismissed charge. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-25,
p.8, Ls.15-17.) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found the state's use of the
word "seek" as limiting any restitution award to the count to which Hurles pied,
stating:
[T]he plea agreement only notes that the State would "seek
restitution." (Emphasis added.) The words of the agreement
include no expression of consent by Hurles to pay any amount of
restitution or to pay for any specified economic loss beyond the
crime charged. The words of the agreement only inform the court
of what the State would try to recover; "It did not relieve the State of
its burden to prove the amount of restitution claimed .... " [State v.
Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 497-98, 283 P.3d 808, 814-15 (Ct. App.
2012)].
Therefore, under the limitations of section 19-5304,
restitution is limited to losses caused by the crime: embezzlement
during the December 2008 to December 2009 time period.
(Opinion, p.11.)
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The Court of Appeals' analysis ignores the only purpose of the restitution
term.

The state has never argued that Hurles "consented" to pay a specific

amount of restitution; obviously she did not. If that were true, there would have
been no need for a restitution hearing. Logic, however, dictates that by including
a term in the plea agreement that allowed the state to seek restitution "on all
DRs," that Hurles would be required to pay restitution for the amounts proven in
relation thereto - amounts the state would not otherwise be entitled to as a
consequence of Hurles' guilty plea to a single count. Otherwise, the restitution
term would be meaningless because the state could, by statute, seek restitution
on Count II regardless of whether it was included in the plea agreement. State v.
Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258, 281 P.3d 90, 95 (2012) ("The parties could have
included restitution in the written plea agreement if they wanted the agreement to
contemplate the issue. When viewing the document within its four corners, the
restitution order did not breach the contract as the issue was not contemplated in
the plea agreement."). The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the restitution term
in the plea agreement did not allow for an award of restitution for conduct
extending beyond Count II is erroneous.
The Court of Appeals also stated:
[E]ven if this Court were to stretch the reading of the plea
agreement to include consent, the plain language of the plea
agreement does not express what Hurles consented to pay
restitution for. To the extent that the plea agreement expressed
consent to pay restitution "on all DRs," the record does not reveal
what "DRs" are and if the "DRs" refer to some time period outside
of the time period charged. The ambiguity as to what (if anything)
Hurles agreed to pay restitution for or what "DRs" means, must be
resolved in favor of the defendant.
Therefore, restitution is

14

awardable only for embezzlement losses within the December 2008
to December 2009 time period.
(Opinion, p.12.)
This Court has reviewed criminal plea agreements using contract law
standards. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90; State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho
593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010). In this regard, the Court has stated:
The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a
question of law over which we may exercise free review, and in
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is to
ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretation. If a written contract is complete upon its face and
unambiguous extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous
negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary,
alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract. If the
language of the document is unambiguous, given its ordinary and
well-understood meaning, we will not look beyond the four corners
of the agreement to determine the intent of the parties.
Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257, 281 P.3d at 94 (quotations, citations and ellipses
omitted).
The plea agreement in this case was not ambiguous.

It clearly and

unequivocally allowed the state to "seek restitution on all DRs that were
disclosed in discovery." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) Rather than expressing
ignorance of what a "DR" is or confusion on what that term meant, defense
counsel acknowledged he had a list of the DRs to which the prosecutor referred
and never objected to the scope of the restitution hearing. Compare Peterson,
148 Idaho at 597, 226 P.3d at 597 ("[T]he prosecutor has an affirmative duty to
dispute the defendant's representation of the scope of the plea agreement, or to
ask for further time to clarify the agreement.

Otherwise silence shall be

interpreted as acceptance of the stated terms."); cf. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho
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353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting it could constitute deficient
performance for an attorney to fail to object to a restitution request when the
defendant was not "previously informed of that consequence").

In

f~ct,

at one

point during the restitution hearing when defense counsel asked Jody Morrison
about losses incurred between 2005 to 2010, she responded, "2004 to 201 O."
(5/19/2011

Tr., p.73, Ls.11-13.)

Defense counsel corrected Jody, stating:

"Okay. We are not really dealing with 2004 because that's - I would just submit
to the court, I think that the prosecutor and I both agree that's outside the statute
of limitations. So we're not -- 2004 is not in the equation." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.73,
Ls.14-19.) The prosecutor confirmed that the "spreadsheet" (State's Exhibit 1)
and related restitution request only covers losses between 2005 to 2010 and
does not extend back through 2004. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.73, L.20 - p.74, L.3.) It is
apparent from the record that the parties who agreed to the restitution term were
familiar not only with what a DR is, but the timeframe covered by the DRs for
which the state was allowed to seek restitution. 5 That the term was not defined
on the record for the benefit of appellate counsel or the appellate court does not
make the term ambiguous and Hurles' effort to declare the term ambiguous, for
the first time on appeal, deprives the state of the benefit of its bargain.

See

Peterson, 148 Idaho at 597, 226 P.3d at 539 (concluding that the state could not
take the benefit of the bargain knowing what the defendant believed was

The police reports accompanying the presentence report, which the Court of
Appeals referenced in addressing Hurles' privilege came (Opinion, p.8), have
"DR" numbers on them indicating that the term "DR" refers to police reports (see,
.s9.,., PSI, pp.22-24).
5
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included within the plea agreement and then deprive the defendant of what he
understood his benefits to be under that same contract).
Even if the Court agrees that "DR" is ambiguous because it is not defined,
Hurles is still not entitled to relief. Hurles never asserted to the district court that
any of the requested or rewarded restitution was beyond the scope of Count II.
Because Hurles raises this issue for the first time on appeal, she must meet her
burden of showing fundamental error. Gomez, 153 Idaho at 256, 281 P.3d at 93.
In order to show fundamental error, Hurles must establish (1) a violation of an
unwaived constitutional right, (2) clear or obvious error that is plain from the
record, and (3) the error affected her substantial rights.

kl

The record does not

show the state exceeded the scope of the restitution claim included in the plea
agreement, and therefore does not support a finding of fundamental error.
"If the State breached the plea agreement, the breach would go to the
foundation of [Hurles'] rights; therefore it must be determined whether there was
a breach." Gomez, 153 Idaho at 256,281 P.3d at 93. As noted, and as even the
Court of Appeals' analysis suggests, there was no breach because, at a
minimum, the plea agreement allowed the state to "seek restitution on all DRs
that were disclosed in discovery." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) Thus, even if
the plea agreement did not require Hurles to pay restitution for the amounts
sought and proved by the state, the state could not breach the plea agreement
merely by asking for the restitution referenced in the plea agreement.
Hurles' claim would also fail on the second prong of the fundamental error
analysis.

If the term "DR" is ambiguous, as Hurles and the Court of Appeals
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claim, then the error cannot be clear or obvious. And, it is anything but plain from
this record that the parties did not have a mutual understanding of the term "DR"
or what the state would seek at the restitution hearing. In fact, the opposite is
true.
Because the Court of Appeals disregarded the purpose of the restitution
term of the plea agreement and erroneously concluded that the term "DR" was
an ambiguous term that should be construed against the state, all of which is
contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent and controlling legal standards, this
Court should grant review and conclude Hurles has failed to meet her burden of
showing that the restitution sought by the state and awarded to the victims was
erroneous.

11.
Review Is Appropriate Because The Court Of Appeals' Conclusion That The
Victims' Accountant-Client Privilege Was Waived Is Contrary To Well-Established
Precedent
A.

Introduction
The Court of Appeals rejected the state's assertion that Hurles' claims

regarding whether the accountant-client privilege was waived because, the Court
concluded, the district "court's application of the privilege and exclusion of the
accountant create[d] the adverse ruling that Hurles can appeal from." (Opinion,
p.7.) If Hurles had challenged the district court's initial decision to exclude Mr.
Warr based on its determination that the privilege was not waived in this case
based on the fact that the Morrisons sued him in a different case - which was the
argument Hurles made below - then the Court of Appeals' finding of an adverse
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ruling would be correct. Since that is not what occurred, the Court's rejection of
the state's waiver argument was erroneous and inconsistent with the wellestablished rule that arguments must be preserved in order to be considered on
appeal. Further, the Court of Appeals' statement that it need not consider the
state's waiver argument is an unwarranted expansion of Zichko.

Finally, the

Court of Appeals' finding that there was a waiver is erroneous.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The general rule in Idaho is that the trial court has sole discretion in

deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence."

State v. Howard, 135 Idaho

727, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001) (citation omitted). "Appellate courts review trial court
decisions admitting or excluding evidence under the abuse of discretion
standard."

kt at 731-732,

24 P.3d at 48-49. "The trial court's broad discretion in

the admission of evidence at trial will be reversed only when there has been a
clear abuse of that discretion."

kt

at 732, 24 P.3d at 49.

In evaluating a

discretionary decision, this Court considers "1) whether the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court acted within the
outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919,921,216 P.3d 1291, 1293
(Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).
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C.

The Court Of Appeals, Contrary To Well-Established Precedent, Reversed
The District Court On Grounds Never Presented To Or Ruled On By The
District Court
When the Morrisons first asserted their accountant-client privilege, Hurles

argued the privilege was waived because the Morrisons had filed a lawsuit
against Mr. Warr and that the lawsuit allowed Mr. Warr to "now defend himself."
(8/4/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-18.) The district court correctly rejected the lawsuit as
a basis for waiving the privilege in this case.
L.24.)

(8/4/2011 Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.14,

Indeed, Hurles did not claim the court's conclusion in this regard was

erroneous. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.10-21.) Instead, Hurles proffered
other grounds in support of her waiver argument (id.), some of which were at
least similar to the arguments she made at the second restitution hearing
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, Ls.18-21, p.96, Ls.5-16, p.96, L.22-p.97, L.7). The district
court, however, never ruled on those grounds for waiver; nor was Hurles even
prepared to present testimony from Mr. Warr at the second restitution hearing.
(See 8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, L.13 - p.96, L.10.)

Having no other evidence to

consider at that time, the district court determined it would "order the restitution
that[] [had] been proved to [it] at th[at] point" and gave Hurles "30 days in which
to come and move for reconsideration if you think that's inappropriate and try and to prove ... that the . . . accountant/client relationship has been breached
and that [Hurles would be] entitled, then, to bring the accountant in." (8/11/2011
Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.98, L.7.)

Trial counsel responded, "That would be fine"

(8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, L.8), but never pursued the claim further.

It is for this

reason that the state submits Hurles failed to adequately preserve her claim
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relating to whether the accountant-client privilege was waived. The district court
asked counsel to research the issue, review the testimony from the first
restitution hearing, and see what Judy "said in relationship to her accountant to
determine whether or not there was [a] waiver." (8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, Ls.9-15.)
The following exchange then occurred:
[THE COURT:] Looks to me like the only thing that -- that
stands between the restitution figure being requested and the client
paying that amount is potentially whether or not the -- you can
impeach the victim through the accountant.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.
THE COURT: Is that what you want to do?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, L.22 - p.99, L.4.)
Again, counsel did not do so and perhaps with good reason. For example,
counsel may have decided, upon further discussion with Mr. Warr and review of
Jody's testimony, that the privilege was not waived or that Mr. Warr could not, or
would not, testify as to any statements Jody allegedly made to him during his
representation of her. Whatever the motivation, or lack thereof, Hurles did not
give the district court the opportunity to rule on the issue of waiver beyond
rejecting her original claim that the waiver was the result of a separate lawsuit - a
determination that Hurles does not challenge. Consequently, this Court should
decline to consider Hurles' arguments.

This Court's opinion in Zichko, supra,

does not require the Court to disregard the state's preservation argument.
In Zichko, this Court, citing I.AR. 35, stated: "When issues on appeal are
not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be
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considered."

129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970.

Thus, "[a] party waives an

issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are
lacking."

kl

In addressing the privilege issue, the Court of Appeals, relying on

I.A.R. 35 and Zichko, said the state's argument that Hurles' failure to file a
"motion to reconsider, as suggested by the trial court" resulted in abandonment
of that claim "need not [be] consider[ed]" because the state "cite[d] no legal
authority for its position that Hurles was required to move the district court to
reconsider its decision to exclude the accountant in order to preserve the issue
for appeal." (Opinion, pp.7-8.) The Court of Appeals' position on this point is
flawed for at least two reasons.

First, the state's preservation argument was

supported by authority that stands for the proposition that the district court must
be given an opportunity to rule on an issue in order for there to be an adverse
ruling for the appellate court to consider. (Brief of Respondent, p.9 (citing State
v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999)).) Second, the Court of
Appeals' characterization of the state's argument is incorrect. The state does not
contend that a "post-trial motion" is necessary to "preserve an issue for appeal."
(Opinion, p.8.) An appellant claiming error must, however, preserve the issue
raised and obtain a ruling on that issue.

That the district court ruled on an

argument related to waiver does not mean that any argument Hurles desires to
advance on appeal has been preserved. See State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868,
871, 264 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2011) ("An objection on one ground will not
preserve a separate and different basis for excluding the evidence."). The district
court's ruling on Hurles' claim that the privilege was waived because the
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Morrisons sued Mr. Warr was not adequate to preserve grounds for waiver later
asserted, but not ruled on, much less grounds asserted for the first time on
appeal. It is for these reasons that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding the

state waived its preservation argument and should have instead held that Hurles
waived her arguments on this issue.

D.

The Court Of Appeals' Conclusion That The Accountant-Client Privilege
Was Waived, Based On Documents It Found Elsewhere In The Record, Is
Contrary To Established Law
Rule 515(b), I.R.E., sets forth the accountant-client privilege as follows:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional accounting
services to the client which were made (1) between the client or the
client's representative and the accountant or the accountant's
representative, (2) between the accountant and the accountant's
representative, or (3) by the client or the client's representative or
the client's accountant or a representative of the accountant to an
accountant or a representative of an accountant representing
another concerning a matter of common interest, (4) between
representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client, or (5) among accountants and their
representatives representing the same client.
The privilege is also codified in I.C. § 9-203A, which reads: "Any licensed

public accountant, or certified public accountant, cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as a witness as to any communication made by the client
to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment."
Disclosure to a third party may result in a waiver of the privilege. BAA, PLC v.
Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Company, 929 A.2d 1, 17 (Md. 2007).
The Court of Appeals erred in finding, for the first time on appeal, that the
privilege was waived on the grounds that "the accountant had discussed the ATM

23

balance problem with police during the police investigation" and provided
"documents originating from the accountant's firm" to law enforcement. (Opinion,
p.8.) The flaw in this finding is that the state did not, as Hurles argued, "rel[y] on
Mr. Warr's documents to calculate the amount of restitution." (Appellant's Brief,
p.15.) At no time during the state's presentation of evidence in the restitution
hearing did the prosecutor offer Mr. Warr's documents to "calculate the restitution
amount."

The documentary evidence admitted in support of the restitution

request was the spreadsheet prepared by Allison Berriochoa, a paralegal at
Givens Pursley, not Mr. Warr.

While the Loss Statement - Request for

Restitution Jody prepared and submitted to the presentence investigator has
documents attached that appear to have been faxed by Mr. Warr's accounting
firm, Wilson, Harrison & Co., Hurles' assertion that these documents were
ultimately relied upon to support the restitution request is unsupported by the
record.

(PSI, pp.289-96 (Loss Statement - Request for Restitution); 8/4/2011

Tr., p.10, L.19 - p.11, L.16 (Mr. Warr's testimony that he is a partner with Wilson
Harrison Company and previously represented

Crescent); see generally

5/19/2011 Tr. (evidence offered in support of restitution hearing); State's Exhibit
1 (spreadsheet with restitution amounts).)

In fact, the cover letter from the

Morrisons' attorney to the prosecutor that accompanied Ms. Berriochoa's
spreadsheet states the "spreadsheet is based on the check and deposit records
and U.S. Bank statements kept and provided by Butch and Jody Morrison." (PSI,
p.187.)
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The basis for Hurles' argument to the contrary is defense counsel's
comments from the second restitution hearing where he stated:
problem.

"here is my

They're going to use Mr. Warr's documents for the presentence

investigation, they can't claim privilege and turn around and say, okay, he can't
testify as to what those documents are."
8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16).)

(Appellant's Brief, p.15 (quoting

Hurles has taken this comment out of context.

That comment was made in response to a statement by the prosecutor wherein
she noted that, based on the information in the police reports, Mr. Warr's "view
[was] that there was a theft, and the fact that it was over $100,000 is already
documented in the police reports." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.5-7.) It is in response
to that statement that defense counsel commented about the state's alleged
"use" of Mr. Warr's documents.

However, as noted by the district court, the

state's point was not that it was relying on Mr. Warr's documents to prove the
amount owed but to show that "even if Mr. Warr testifies, he's still saying that
there's only $100,000."

(8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-19.)

Indeed, it would be

curious for the state to attempt to "rely" on Mr. Warr's documents at the August 4
hearing when it had already proven the restitution at the May 19 hearing using
the spreadsheet prepared by Ms. Berriochoa, which was "based on the check
and deposit records and U.S. bank statements kept and provided by Butch and
Jody Morrison." (PSI, p.187.)
Hurles also notes that Jody testified at the restitution hearing that she had
"records from [her] then accountant, James Warr, who showed an imbalance in
the credits and the debits of the ATM of checks written to the ATM." (Appellant's
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Brief, p.16 (quoting 5/19/2011 Tr., p.72, Ls.2-5).) Jody then referenced that the
differences were reflected in "column 4."
5/19/2011 Tr., p.72, Ls.7-8).)

(Appellant's Brief, p.16 (quoting

That Morrison may have obtained accounting

records from Mr. Warr does not, however, mean the state relied on his "work
product" to calculate the restitution award. While Mr. Warr's accounting records
may have uncovered the imbalance, the actual work product used in calculating
the loss was prepared by Ms. Berriochoa, not Mr. Warr, and Jody's reference to
"column 4" is clearly a reference to column 4 in State's Exhibit 1, not to any
document created by Mr. Warr.
Further, Hurles seems to misunderstand the distinction between whether
Mr. Warr could discuss the preparation of a certain document if the state had
relied on it and the ability to go beyond that and disclose confidential
communications between him and the Morrisons.

Laying foundation for or

explaining the meaning of a document does not mean the Morrisons would
implicitly waive any privilege between them and their accountant. Nevertheless,
because Hurles' contention that the state relied on Mr. Warr's documents to
"calculate the amount of restitution" is belied by the record, her claim that the
Morrisons' implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege as a result fails.
Hurles also argued Jody "waived the privilege because she disclosed
communications between herself and Mr. Warr."

(Appellant's Brief, p.17.)

Hurles, however, was unclear about what communications she contends Jody
disclosed. Her first argument was based on defense counsel's statements at the
second restitution hearing where he commented that, based on his "recollection,"
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Jody testified "about conversations she had with her accountant." (Appellant's
Brief, p.17.) But Hurles did not identify

testimony she believes waived the

privilege beyond the fact that, on cross-examination, she testified that "Mr. Warr
told her about a $1,300.00 accounting discrepancy, and that he had created new
booking procedures for [Crescent] after discovering various accounting problems
and [the] theft." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 (citing 5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.70,
L.11 ).) This testimony was in response to cross-examination generally designed
to imply that money missing from the ATM was, at least in part, attributable to
Jody and Butch "borrowing" money from it.
L.11.)

(5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.70,

However, "[a]s a general rule, a party does not waive the privilege by

denying the opposing party's accusations .... In addition, a Court cannot justify
finding a waiver of privileged information merely to provide the opposing party
information helpful to its cross-examination or because information is relevant."
Sears 1 Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 714 A.2d 188 (Md. 1998) (citations and
quotations omitted). Further, it is difficult to imagine how responding to questions
on cross-examination about the fact Mr. Warr alerted Jody to an accounting
discrepancy regarding the ATM

resulted

in a waiver of the privileged

communications between her and Mr. Warr.
In conjunction with her waiver argument, Hurles also asserted that Mr.
Warr's testimony "was necessary because it is the only means by which the
district court and Ms. Hurles could get an accurate restitution estimate" since it
was Mr. Warr who "c[a]me up with an amount of loss from the ATM."
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)

Hurles further asserted:
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"Since [she] was cashing

checks, then returning a portion of the proceeds into the ATM, there is no way of
calculating the restitution without the [sic] Mr. Warr's testimony."
Brief, pp.19-20.) This argument is nonsensical.

(Appellant's

While Mr. Warr at one point

provided information to the Morrisons regarding the discrepancies in the ATM, it
does not logically follow that he is the only person who could calculate the
Morrisons' loss. Not even defense counsel suggested as much. To the contrary,
defense counsel's position was not that Mr. Warr was the only person qualified to
calculate restitution, it was that Mr. Warr's testimony was needed to obtain "the
admissions made by the alleged victims in this case." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.22, Ls.89.)

In a related argument, Hurles argued Mr. Warr's testimony was necessary
to "impeach" Jody "over her assertion that the Morrisons were not taking money
out of the ATM." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) In support of this argument, Hurles
recites defense counsel's question on cross-examination of Jody, "Didn't your
accountant actually confront you with the checks signed and endorsed by Butch,
and you denied it for five months?" (Appellant's Brief, p.20 (quoting 5/19/2011
Tr., p.69, Ls.22-24 (alteration by Hurles omitted).)

Hurles then asserts, "If

defense counsel's position is true, then [Jody] lied to the court by inflating the
amount of money Ms. Hurles stole from them." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) The
fundamental problem with Hurles' argument is that there is no evidence that
defense counsel's "position is true." The fact that he implied something through
cross-examination does not make it so.

Nor did defense counsel ever offer

evidence that Mr. Warr could impeach Jody on this point even though the court
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invited him to do so. Hurles is not entitled to relief based upon suppositions she
failed to support with evidence in the district court.
Because Hurles abandoned her waiver claim, the Court should grant
review and decline to consider the issue. Even if considered, this Court should
conclude Hurles has failed to demonstrate any error in relation to the exclusion of
Mr. Warr's testimony.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court grant review and, on review,
affirm the restitution order entered by the district court.
DATED this 18th day of March, 2014.

JESSjlCA M. LORELLO
De~ty Attorney General
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Darla S. Williamson, District Judge.
Order of restitution reversed in part and affirmed in part, and case remanded.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Shawn F. Wilkerson argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued.
GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge
Kristi L. Hurles appeals from the judgment of conviction I entered upon her guilty plea to
one count of grand theft, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(2)(b) and 18-2407(1 )(b ). After
holding restitution hearings, the district court ordered Hurles to pay $204,174.61 in restitution,
under Idaho Code § 19-5304, for embezzlement 2 losses and the victim's attorney fees. Hurles
argues the district court erred by determining that the holders of the accountant-client privilege

Although Hurles appeals from the judgment of conviction, this appeal primarily
challenges the restitution order accompanying the judgment of conviction.
2

Embezzlement and theft are used interchangeably throughout this opinion. In Idaho, theft
is a single offense superseding the separate theft offenses, such as embezzlement. Idaho Code
§ 18-2401. Prior to being repealed, and traditionally, embezzlement referred to theft of personal
property by a person who was entrusted with the property by the owner of the property, such as
an employee. See Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 62, 625 P .2d 414, 416 (1981) ( quoting
since-repealed Idaho Code § 18-2413 defining the crime of embezzlement).

did not impliedly consent to waive the privilege. Hurles also contends the district court abused
its discretion by awarding restitution for the alleged embezzlement that occurred outside of the
time period of the theft Hurles pied guilty to. Furthermore, Hl1rles claims the restitution award
for the embezzlement losses is not based on substantial evidence. As for the attorney fees
restitution avvard, Hurles maintains that the district court abused its discretion by a\varding
attorney fees incurred by the victim for civil cases. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the
restitution order in part, affirm in part, and remand the case to the district court.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
The evidence adduced at the restitution hearings reveals that Hurles worked for a Boise
bar and grille (the business and victim) for a total of twenty years. She was a trusted employee
and most recently served as the business's bookkeeper. Hurles also served as a bartender. One
of Hurles' duties as a bartender was to sell Idaho State Lottery pull-tabs and to pay out on the
winning pull-tabs. As the bookkeeper, Hurles was one of two employees, besides the owners,
authorized to stock the on-site ATM with petty cash; Hurles, though, was primarily responsible
for stocking the ATM. Hurles would also often make the daily deposit at the bank.
After noticing that the business was not receiving the expected commissions from the
pull-tab operation, the owners of the business contacted the Idaho State Lottery. The Idaho State
Lottery conducted an investigation and determined that Hurles had inflated the pay-out amounts
of winning pull-tabs, keeping the excess amounts for herself. In a letter to the Ada County
Prosecutor, the Idaho State Lottery Enforcement Division informed the prosecutor of its
determination that Hurles had embezzled approximately $10,000 via inflated lottery pull-tab
payouts.
The business O\vners also contacted the Boise Police Department because they were made
aware of a discrepancy involving petty cash replenishment checks. An on-site ATM was owned
by a third party, but operated by the business. The business was responsible for placing cash in
the ATM. The ATM owner would reimburse the business for amounts withdrawn from the
ATM and pay the business a po1tion of the fee collected on each transaction. When the ATM
needed to be refilled, a process was implemented to replenish the ATM with cash from the petty
cash safe and to track the replenishment of the petty cash through an "IOU" marker and a
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replenishment check. 3 The petty cash replenishment check was to be deposited in the business's
bank account with the other daily receipts; the amount of petty cash originally removed to
replenish the ATM, as written on the replenishment check, was to be replaced with the daily cash
receipts. The goal of the process was to maintain a steady balance of petty cash in the petty cash
safe and to keep track of the amount of money placed in the ATM. After the Boise Police
Department began their investigation, Hurles admitted to the police that she had taken money
from the business; she estimated she had taken around $20,000 to $50,000. There is no dispute
that Hurles was cashing checks and retaining monies she was supposed to deposit into the
business's bank account.
As a result, Hurles was charged by information with two counts of grand theft, each

occurring "on or between the 30th day of December, 2008 and the 31st day of December, 2009."
(for simplicity, this is referred to as the December 2008 to December 2009 time period). One
count related to the lottery pull-tab commissions; the other count related to the petty cash
replenishment checks.

Hurles and the prosecutor reached a plea agreement wherein Hurles

agreed to plead gt1ilty to the count relating to the petty cash replenishment checks and the State
agreed to dismiss the other count. The plea agreement was not reduced to writing, but was
instead offered into the record orally by the prosecutor at the plea hearing. Following the plea
hearing, the district court scheduled a restitution hearing and requested a presentence
investigation (PSJ) report be prepared.
At the first restitution hearing, the State presented testimony from three witnesses: an
Idaho State Lottery investigator; a paralegal, employed by the law firm retained by the business,
who prepared a spreadsheet of losses related to the petty cash replenishment checks; and one of

The detailed process of replenishing the ATM with cash was as fol lows: ( l) Hurles
would check the ATM and note that the ATM was low on funds; (2) Hurles would remove petty
cash from the petty cash safe and place the money in the ATM; (3) Hurles would place an "JOU"
marker in the petty cash safe with a notation written for the amount of cash removed from the
petty cash safe; (4) an owner would write a check in the amount of the IOU marker and replace
the IOU marker in the petty cash safe with the replenishment check--the petty cash
replenishment check was to have "ATM" written in the memorandum line; (5) Hurles would
collect the daily cash receipts from the previous day in a bank bag; (6) Hurles would "sell" the
replenishment check to the daily cash receipts bag--that is, Hurles would take the check out of
the petty cash safe, place the check in the bank bag, and remove the amount of the replenishment
check in cash from the bank bag and place the cash in the petty cash safe; and (7) Hurles would
deposit the daily receipts bank bag, including the replenishment checks, at the business's bank.
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the owners of the business. The lottery investigator testified to the steps she used in determining
that the business was short $ l 0,000 from the lottery pull-tab commissions.

The paralegal

testified that she reviewed copies of checks provided by the owners and then constructed a
spreadsheet based on her review of the checks. The spreadsheet was entered into evidence. The
spreadsheet contained "a small portion of the universe of checks" the paralegal reviewed because
it contained only the checks that were cashed.
The paralegal testified she reached a total of $153,920 in petty cash replenishment check
losses from 2005 through 20 I0. This total was based on the sum of cashed checks that were;
(I) stamped "for deposit only," but endorsed by Hurles (totaling $7,200); (2) unstamped, but
endorsed by Hurles (totaling $27,760); (3) stamped "for deposit only," but with the stamp
stricken and endorsed by Hurles (totaling $4,300); and (4) stamped "for deposit only," but not
endorsed (totaling $114,660). Excluded from the restitution total, according to the paralegal,
were cashed checks that were: (I) stamped "for deposit only," but endorsed by someone other
than Hurles (totaling $11, l 00); (2) unstamped and not endorsed (totaling $99, 11 0);
(3) unstamped, but endorsed by someone other than Hurles (totaling $5,400); (4) unstamped, but
signed by an unauthorized signatory (totaling $4, I00); (5) stamped with the business's typical
deposit stamp, but not stamped "for deposit only" (totaling $500); and (6) stamped "for deposit
only," but with the stamp stricken and endorsed by someone other than Hurles (totaling $6,600).
One of the owners of the business testified and was cross-examined by Hurles' defense
attorney. Following this witness, Hurles' defense attorney informed the district court that he
wished to call the business's accountant. The district court then scheduled a second restitution
hearing.
At the second restitution hearing, Hurles' defense attorney called the business's
accountant to testify. The accountant testified to his employment and confirmed the business
was a client. Hurles' defense attorney asked the accountant if the accountant was familiar with
the ATM balance problem, to which the accountant said yes. The defense attorney then asked
the accountant to describe the nature of the ATM balance problem. At that point, the prosecutor
informed the court that the owners of the business wished to assert their accountant-client
privilege. After discussion between the court, Hurles' defense attorney and the prosecutor, the
court excused the accountant from the stand. Also during the second restitution hearing, the
prosecutor oITered a revised total embezzlement loss of $155,440, including both the lottery and
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petty cash replenishment check losses, after correcting some errors discovered
period

and in the

first hearing. 4 The court continued the hearing.
At the third restitution hearing and sentencing, Hurles' defense attorney informed the

court that the defense had no other witnesses. Hurles' defense attorney, the prosecutor, and the
court then began a discussion concerning the accountant and whether the accountant-client
privilege had been waived. following the discussion, the court moved forward with sentencing
and heard statements from the owners, arguments from the prosecutor and defense attorney, and
heard a statement from Hurles. The district court then sentenced Hurles to a unified term of
fourteen years, with two years determinate, and ordered restitution in favor of the business in the
amounts of $155,440 for embezzlement losses 5 and $48,734.61 for attorney fees for civil cases.
Hurles appeals.

II.
ANALYSIS
Hurles argues four points on appeal: (!) the district coutt erred by determining that the
owners of the business did not impliedly consent to waive their accountant-client privilege;
(2) the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for the alleged embezzlement
that occurred outside of the time period of theft Hurles pied guilty to; (3) the restitution award
for the embezzlement losses is not based on substantial evidence; 6 and (4) the district court
abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees incurred by the business for civil cases.

A.

The Accountant-Client Privilege
Hurles argues the district court ened by determining that the business owners did not

impliedly consent to waive their accountant-client privilege. Hurles maintains that the owners

4

At the first restitution hearing, the initial claimed total embezzlement loss was $163,920,
including the $ I 0,000 Idaho State Lottery pull tab loss and the $153,920 petty cash
replenishment check loss. We infer, based on the record, that the petty cash replenishment check
loss was reduced to $145,440.

5

Part of the embezzlement losses included theft related to an Idaho State Lottery pull tab
operation. This portion of the restitution award, in the amount of $10,000, is not challenged on
appeal.
6

Because \Ve reverse as to the award of restitution for the embezzlement losses and
remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion, we need not address whether the
restitution award for the embezzlement losses is based on substantial evidence.

5

relied on
of

accountant's documents to calculate the amount of restitution and injected the issue

accountant's work.

Additionally, Hurles contends the testifying owner waived the

privilege because the owner disclosed communications between herself and the accountant, and
Hurles contends both owners waived the privilege when they had Hurles' defense attorney speak
with the accountant about the amount of restitution. Hurles claims the accountant's testimony is
needed to obtain an accurate restitution estimate and to impeach the owner who testified. The
State argues Hurles abandoned her claim below because Hurles never allowed the district court
to make an adverse ruling. Alternatively, the State contends the owners did not impliedly waive
their accountant-client privilege.

Ultimately the issue is whether, in ruling on the

accountant-client privilege, the district court improperly excluded testimony from the accountant
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 51 S(b), 7 an accountant's client "has a privilege to refuse
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional accounting services to the client"
made in certain circumstances, The client can be a person, a corporation, or an association.

LR.E. 51 S(a)( I). Confidential communications include those "not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of
professional accounting services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission
of the communication." LR.E. 5 I 5(a)(5).
We review the district cornt's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 731, 240 P.3d 575, 577 (20 I0). The same standard
applies in reviewing a district court's application of a privilege. E.g., United States v. i\tfejia, 655
FJd 126, 13 l (2d Cir. 2011) (stating the court has repeatedly held that rulings on claims of
attorney-client privilege are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

When a trial court's

discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry
to determine: (I) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the lower cou1t acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court

The accountant-client privilege is codified at Idaho Code § 9-203A. We refer to Idaho
Rule of Evidence 515, as the evidentiary rule supersedes the statute in any potential conflict with
the statutory section. l.R.B. 1102.
6

reached

by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 fdaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d

!331,1333(1
We initially address the State's contention that Hurles abandoned her claim concerning
the waiver of the accountant-client privilege. According to the State, Hurles cannot properiy
raise the issue on appeal because the district court was not given the opportunity to make a ruling
on whether the prlviiege had been waived. The State cites to State v. Barnes, l 33 Idaho 378, 987
P.2d 290 (1999), where the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "This Court will not 'review a trial
court's alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the
basis for the assignment of error."' Barnes, 133 Idaho at 384,987 P.2d at 296 (quoting State v.
Fisher, 123 Idaho 481,485,849 P.2d 942,946 (1993)). At the second restitution hearing, Hurles

called the accountant as an adverse witness. After laying a foundation, Hurles' defense attorney
inqllired of the accountant the nature of the ATM discrepancy. At this point, the prosecutor
informed the court that the owners wished to exercise their accountant-client privilege. 8 The
court, after additional discussion with the attorneys, recognized the privilege and excused the
witness. The corn1's application of the privilege and exclusion of the accountant creates the
adverse ruling that Hurles can appeal from.

CJ State

v. Jwakiri, 106 Idaho 618,621,682 P.2d

571, 574 ( 1984) (reviewing, on appeal, the trial court's ruling that the attorney-client privilege
was waived, which allowed the attorney to testify at trial). The fact that Hurles' defense attorney
did not file a motion to reconsider, as suggested by the trial court, does not translate to
abandonment of the privilege waiver claim. The State's argument to the contrary cites no legal
authority for its position that Hurles was required to move the district court to reconsider its
8

At the second restitution hearing, after Hurles' defense attorney asked a few foundational
questions of the accountant, the following exchange occurred:
[Defense Attorney]:

And at some point, did it come to your knowledge that there was a
controversy or a prob Iem with the ATM balance at the [business]?
IAccountant]:
Yes.
[Defense Attorney]: Could you just describe to the corn1 what the nature of that was?
(Accountant]:
The ATM machine--the nature of the accounting was that checks
would be written-[Prosecutor]:
Yam Honor, just for the record--! apologize--[the owners of the
business] would be interested in asserting their privilege to the
attorney client privilege undet; [daho-[The Court]:
ls he an attorney?
[Prosecutor):
l mean, accountant client privilege.
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decision to exclude the accountant in order to preserve the issue for appeal.

Without legal

authority, the State has waived the argument, and we need not consider it. Idaho Appellate
Rule 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Moreover, there is
nothing in the Idaho Supreme Court's rules requiring such a post-trial motion to preserve an
issue for appeal. In consequence, Hurles has not abandoned the privilege waiver issue.
At the point the privilege was asserted, the question by defense counsel inquired of the
accountant's understanding of the problem with the ATM balance. As the PSI report reveals, the
accountant had discussed the ATM balance problem with police during the police investigation.
A Boise Police Department report, included in the PSI report, states that the accountant
explained to the police how he determined the losses relating to the replenishment check
embezzlement Moreover, the same police repoit references documents originating from the
accountant's firm that were included in the PSI repo11. These communications--which were
made to a third party, the Boise Police Department--are not covered by Idaho Rule of
Evidence 515. See Farr v. Mischler, 129 Idaho 201,207,923 P.2d 446,452 (1996) ("To be a
confidential communication the communication must 'not be intended to be disclosed to third
persons.' I.R.E. 502(a)(5). Farr's argument fails because he did not act in a manner indicating
that the communication was to be confidential."). Considering that the accountant's information
recited to the police directly dealt with the embezzlement losses, we must reverse the restitution
order as to the award of restitution for embezzlement losses and remand to the district court so
that Hurles may pursue the accountant's testimony. On remand, the district court may have to
address the applicability of the accountant-client privilege to other testimony by the accountant,
an issue on which we do not express an opinion.
B.

The Restitution Award
In addition to the accountant-client privilege issue, we address two specific challenges

raised by Hurles attacking the embezzlement losses and attorney fees in the restitution award.
Under the statutory scheme of Idaho Code § 19-5304, a district court must order restitution,
unless inappropriate or undesirable, if the district cowt finds the defendant guilty of a crime that
resulted in economic loss to the victim and the victim actually suffers the loss.
§ 19-5304(2).

LC.

Economic loss is based on a preponderance of evidence submitted by the

prosecutor, defendant, victim, and presentence investigator. LC. § 19-5304(6). The court may
consider hearsay in the PSI report.

Id.; I.R.E. l Ol (d)(7).
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In determining the amount of

the court must consider factors enumerated in section 19-5304(7). The restitution
amount awarded under section 19-5304(2) must be causally related to the crime--both actual
proximate cause must be satisfied. State v. Corb11s, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 40 l
(20 l l ). In addition, "The court may, with the consent of the parties, order restitution to victims
and/or any other person or entity, for economic loss or injury for crimes which are not
adjudicated or are not before the court." J.C.§ 19-5304(9); accord State v. Hargis, 126 Idaho
727, 730, 889 P.2d 11 l 7, 1120 (Ct. App. 1995). That is, even if the losses are not causally
related to the crime, a defendant may consent to pay restitution.
On appeal, we review the decision to order restitution and the amount of restitution for an
abuse of discretion, guided by the consideration of the factors enumerated in section 19-5304(7).
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 40 I.

When a trial court's discretionary decision is

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower cowt
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600, 768 P.2d at 1333.
1.

Embezzlement loses

Hurles argues the district court abused its discretion when it included restitution for
checks that were cashed between 2005 and November 2008 and January 2009 through 20 l O.
The testimony of the paralegal presented the sum of embezzlement losses from 2005 through
20 I 0.

Hurles was charged by information with grand theft during the December 2008 to

December 2009 time period. The crime to which Hurles pied guilty was grand theft during the
December 2008 to December 2009 time period. Therefore, under section 19-5304(2), the district
court was allowed to award restitution for losses suffered by the business during the December
2008 to December 2009 time period, as long as the losses were causally related to the crime
charged. See State v. Schultz, l 48 Idaho 884, 886-87, 23 l P.3d 529, 530-3 l (Ct. App. 2008).
The district court may award restitution for losses not caused by the adjudicated crime
with the consent of the parties. J.C. § 19-5304(9). Generally, consent to pay restitution beyond
the adjudicated crime is found in the plea agreement in cases where the defendant pleads guilty
via a plea agreement. E.g., State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 (Ct. App. 2007)
(determining that restitution could not be awarded under section I9-5304(2), but restitution could
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be awarded under section 19-5304(9) because

defendant agreed in the plea agreement to pay

restitution in an "amount to be determined").
When a plea is offered pursuant to a plea agreement, "the court shall, on the record,
require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera,
at tbe time the plea is offered." ldaho Criminal Rule 11 (f)(2).

Full disclosure of the plea

agreement on the record is necessary because, among other reasons, "[i]t is impossible for a trial
judge to properly administer a plea agreement if it consists of secret terms known only to the
parties." Baker v. United States, 78 l F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. l 986). If a plea agreement has not
been reduced to writing, "it is incumbent upon the attorneys to state the agreement in its entirety
on the record, and in a clear and coherent manner." State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 575, 861
P.2d 1234, 1240 (Ct. App. 1993); accord State v. Ruthe,ford, 107 Idaho 9 l 0, 914, 693 P.2d
11 12, 1116 (Ct. App. 1985).
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined by comts in
accordance with contract law standards. State v. Allen, ! 43 Idaho 267, 272, 141 P .3d l l 36, 1141
(Ct. App. 2006).

"As with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are occasionally

ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear responsibility for any lack of clarity."' Slate v.

Peterson, 148 Idaho 593,596,226 P.3d 535,538 (2010) (quoting United States v. De la Fuente,
8 F.3d 1333, l 338 (9th Cir. 1993)). "[A ]mbiguities are construed in favor of the defendant.
Focusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding also reflects the proper constitutional
focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty." Id. (quoting De la Fuente, 8 F.3d at 1337
n.7) (alteration in original). See also State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 745, 52 P.3d 886, 890
(Ct. App, 2002); State v. Cole, 135 [daho 269, 272, 16 P.3d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 2000). The
determination that a plea agreement is ambiguous is a question of law; however, interpretation of
an ambiguous term is a question of fact. Allen, 143 Idaho at 272, 141 P .3d at I I41. Factual
determinations made by a trial court will not be set aside on review unless they are clearly
erroneous. Peter:s·on, 148 Idaho at 595, 226 P.3d at 537.
In State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 283 P.3d 808 (Ct. App. 2012), N ienburg entered into
a plea agreement that provided, "Restitution is not lo exceed $1, 156.98." Id. at 493, 283 P.3d at
8 IO (emphasis added). Nienburg contended that $1088.98 for vehicle repairs, resulting from
damage to a police vehicle caused by Nienburg's dog that escaped when Nienburg fled, was not
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as part

the restitution for the crime Nienburg pied to, driving under the influence. On

appeal we determined the plea agreement was unambiguous:
The words of the agreement include no expression of consent by Nienburg to pay
any amount of restitution or to pay for any specified economic loss. They also do
not express any consent by Nienburg to pay for restitution that was not
proximately caused by his DUI, the offense to which he pleaded guilty. The
stated agreement was a cap on the amount of restitution to which Nienburg could
be subjected, and nothing more.

Id. at 497, 283 PJd at 814. Accordingly, we concluded:
[E]xcept for setting a cap on the amount that may be awarded, the plea agreement
did not alter the operation of the Idaho restitution statutes. It did not relieve the
State of its burden to prove any amount of restitution claimed, nor did it subject
Nienburg to payment of restitution not proximately caused by the offense to
which he pleaded guilty.
Id at 497-98, 283 PJd at 814-15.
In this case, the plea agreement's provision concerning restitution was not reduced to
writing, but was instead orally offered into the record by the prosecution. The prosecutor stated:
Your Honor, the state's going to recommend a unified sentence of l 4
years, 2 years fixed with 12 indeterminate. The state is going to seek restitution
on all DRs that were disclosed in discovery. I have a list of those right here, but I
think defense counsel understands the ones we're talking about.
(Emphasis added.) There are two issues with this plea agreement. First, the plea agreement only
notes that the State would "seek restitution." (Emphasis added.) The words of the agreement
include no expression of consent by Hurles to pay any amount of restitution or to pay for any
specified economic loss beyond the crime charged. The words of the agreement only inform the
court of what the State would try to recover; "It did not relieve the State of its burden to prove
any amount of restitution claimed .... " Id. Therefore, under the limitations of section 19-5304,
restitution is limited to losses caused by the crime: embezzlement during the December 2008 to
December 2009 time period. Second, even if this Cowi were to stretch the reading of the plea
agreement to include consent, the plain language of the plea agreement does not express what
Hurles consented to pay restitution for. To the extent that the plea agreement expressed consent
to pay restitution "on all DRs," the record does not reveal what "DRs" are and if the "DRs" refer
to some time period outside of the time period charged. The ambiguity as to what (if anything)
Hurles agreed to pay restitution for or what "DRs" means, must be resolved in favor of the
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defendant.

Therefore, restitution is awardable

December 2008 to December 2009

for embezzlement losses within the

period.

The State suggests that Hurles consented to pay restitution at the third restitution hearing
and sentencing nearly six months after Hudes agreed to the plea agreement and entered a guilty
plea in reliance on the agreement. At the third restitution hearing, the district court addressed
restitution as part of the sentencing:
[The Court]:

[Hurles]:

All right. Let's go ahead and go forward with
sentencing. So the restitution ... the court does order at
this time [is] $204,174.
Ms. Hurles, you previously appeared in court, and
you pied guilty to grand theft, Count fl; and Count I was
dismissed. The state is going to recommend an underlying
sentence of two years fixed plus l 2 indeterminate for a total
of 14 years. You are to pay restitution on all incidences,
not simply the one grand theft charge, but the entire time
that you were there working for the employer and any
thefts that may have occurred. So restitution was to cover
all of that. The state is going to ask for imposition, that you
go to the penitentiary, and you 're free to argue for
something different.
Is that your understanding of the prior proceedings,
Ms. Hurles?
Yes, ma'am.

(Emphasis added.)
We are not convinced that Hurles' statement to the court is consent to pay restitution.
Instead, the statement merely offers Hurles' acquiescence to the court's description of what had
happened in prior proceedings. Moreover, a defendant's acquiescence to a district court's error
in recalling what the plea agreement was does not pollute the waters upstream.

As we

recognized in Nienburg, the district court's error applying the restitution statute or recalling the
restitution terms does not obliterate the plea agreement that the defendant and the State agreed to,
nor is the State's statutory burden changed. What is more, if we accept the State's contention, it
would be quite perplexing for a district court to announce that it is ordering restitution and then
seek consent when section 19-5304(9) mandates the court to first have "the consent of the
parties" in order to award restitution outside of section 19-5304(2).
In sum, the record reveals that Hurles pied guilty to embezzlement during the December
2008 to December 2009 time period. Hurles' plea agreement does not express Hurles' consent to
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in contrast, it reflects that the State would "seek"
Hurles consented to pay restitution for

The record does not
crimes at the sentencing hearing

held more than six months aner the plea agreement was entered into the record. On remand, in
accordance wlth section 19-5304, restitution ls awardable for embezzlement losses during the
December 2008 to December 2009 time period, the time period of theft that Hurles pied guilty
to.
2.

Attorney fees

Hurles also contends the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for
attorney fees incurred by the business for civil cases. Included in the attorney fees were fees for
six expenditure categories: (I) attorney fees for a possible complaint against the business's
accountant and the accountant's firm; (2) fees paid to a law firm for an accountant's review in
preparation of filing a complaint against the business's accountant and the accountant's firm;
(3) attorney fees associated with the actual complaint against the business's accountant and the
accountant's firm; (4) attorney foes associated with a complaint against the business's bank;
(5) attorney fees associated with filing an adversary complaint in Hurles' bankruptcy; and
(6) attorney fees associated with Hurles' restitution hearing.
At the first restitution hearing, in response to a question from the district court, the
testifying owner of the business stated that she incurred attorney fees. The district court then
stated that it needed to be apprised of the amounts the owners were spending "on attorneys and
accountants and other people to figure out what's been stolen." Immediately after the district
court made this statement, Hurles' defense attorney objected, and the district court stated:
You can object to it. But if you [the testifying owner] would provide that
information to me at the final restitution hearing, I'd like to know that to know
what all the victim is out as a result of the theft that occurred to the victim. The
victim is entitled to be paid for compensation for what they are out as a result of
the theft.
Hurles argues that under the analysis of State v, Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 139 PJd 767 (Ct.
App. 2006), attorney fees for civil cases are noneconomic damages and cannot be awarded via
restitution.

Specifically, Hurles contends the fees associated with a complaint against the

accountant and the accountant's firm are based on the accountant's breach of duty and are
against a third party. Hurles notes that the basis for the lawsuit against the bank is unclear and
that the lawsuit is against a third party. As to the fees related to the bankruptcy, Hurles asserts
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the preparatron of the bankruptcy adversary

was a move to prevent future harm and is

not compensable under Parker. Hurles further argues the amount of the attorney foes associated
with Hurles' restitution hearing is unreasonable because it represents the amount spent for a
paralegal to prepare a spreadsheet.
In Parker, we analyzed whether certain attorney fees were a direct economic loss as a
result of criminal conduct. Parker was a bookkeeper at a business when she forged ten business
checks and deposited them into her own account. Parker pled guilty to one count of forgery. A
provision in the restitution order required Parker to pay attorney fees in the victim's civil case
against Parker.

We looked to prior cases and determined that economic loss awardable as

restitution included "necessary expenses or losses that the victim incurred in order to address the
consequences of the criminal conduct." Id. at 167, !39 P.3d at 769. We also noted that an
expense to prevent future harm was not compensable as restitution,

Id. (citing State v.

Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624, 97 P.3d 489, 491 (Ct. App. 2004)). The principal question in
assessing the restitution award for attorney fees in Parker was whether the attorney fees for

filing the civil lawsuit were an expense that was necessary in order for the victim to recover the
losses caused by Parker's forgeries. Id.

at

168, 139 PJd at 770. The victim's civil complaint,

although including a claim for the amount of forged checks, also included claims for damages for
overpayment of wages and for conspiracy and unjust enrichment related to two other defendants.
Id. The lawsuit and attorney fees "were unnecessary to recover the victim's direct loss caused by
the forgeries, for that loss was entirely compensable through the restitution order in the criminal
case." Id Tims, we held the attorney fees in the Parker lawsuit were not an economic loss
under section 19-5304( I )(a). Parker, 143 ldaho at 168, 139 P.3d at 770.
a,

Attorney fees concerning the accountant and the accountant's firm

and the bank
Of the six expenditure categories of attorney fees awarded, three concern a legal action
against the business's accountant and the accountant's firm, and one concerns a legal action
against the business's bank. As both parties acknowledge, the record contains only a scintilla of
information concerning the purpose behind the lawsuits. Indeed, the State acknowledges that
"the record does not include much detail regarding the lawsuits filed by the [owners of the
business] against their accountant and bank," but the State suggests "the lawsuits were
undoubtedly filed as the result of Hurles' thefts." Before determining whether the attorney fees
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were caused by the crime, we must determine if the attorney

are a direct economic loss

under Parker.
For the attorney fees to be considered a direct economic loss, they must be necessary for
the business to recover the losses caused by Hurles' embezzlement. Parker, 143 1daho at 167,
139 P.3d at 769. We cannot say that the attorney fees associated with an action against the
accountant and the accountant's firm are necessary to recover the losses from Hurles' crime.
Accordingly, the attorney fees for the legal action concerning the accountant and the
accountant's firm are not awardable as restitution. The same is true with the attorney fees for an
action against the business's bank, as they are not necessary to recover losses that were
embezzled by Hurles.
b,

Attorney fees concerning the bankruptcy proceedings

The business also incurred attorney fees for the preparation and filing of an adversary
complaint in Hurles' bankruptcy. As the PSI investigator noted, Hurles and her husband filed for
bankruptcy in December 20 I 0. When a bankruptcy proceeding is pending, "[Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure) 700 l sets forth ten matters that must be brought as adversary
proceedings, including, with exceptions not relevant in this case, a proceeding to recover money
or property." In re Dean, 359 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006). "Adversary proceedings
have been described as 'full blown federal lawsuits within the larger bankruptcy case."' Id
(quoting In re Wood and Locker, Inc., 868 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1989)). Once Hurles filed for
bankruptcy, it became necessary for the business to incur attorney fees to prepare and file an
adversary complaint to recover losses caused by Hurles' embezzlement. Thus, the attorney fees
related to the bankruptcy adversary complaint are an economic loss under Parker. Contrary to
Hurles' assertion that the fees are to prevent a future harm and not compensable, the fees are not
meant to prevent future harm as referenced in fYaidelich, 140 Idaho at 624, 97 P.3d at 491. In
Waidelich, Waidelich had attempted to break into the victim's home and steal a puppy. The

owner sought restitution for boarding the puppies "out of concern that Waidelich or his
accomplices would return to steal the puppies." Id at 623, 97 P.3d at 490.

Because the

puppy-boarding expenses were an attempt to prevent a future harm, we determined they were
"not a proper item of restitution under Idaho Code§ 19-5304." Id at 624, 97 P.3d at 491. Here,
the attorney fees for preparation of an adversary complaint in the bankruptcy proceeding were
necessary in order for the business to protect the l'ight to recover the losses already directly
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caused by Hurles' embezzlement. Otherwise,
been discharged in bankrnprcy.

business's claim against Hurles might have
the district court did not abuse

discretion

awarding attorney fees concerning an adversary complaint made necessary as a result of Hurles'
bankruptcy.
c.

Attorney Fees Concerning tbe Restitution Hearing

The business further incurred attorney fees by having a law firm represent it during the
restitution hearing, including fees associated with the preparation of the embezzlement loss
spreadsheet prepared and presented by the paralegal.

Attorney fees spent determining the

amount of restitution for the defendant's crime are allowed under Parker, as they are necessary
to recover the losses related to a defendant's crime. Parker, 143 Idaho at 167, !39 P.3d at 769.
Here, the award included restitution for the attorney fees incurred in preparing a spreadsheet
showing embezzlement losses from 2005 through 20 I 0. Ho,vever, the restitution statute limits
the discretion of the court in awarding restitution to the crime charged. ln this case, that time
frame is limited to the December 2008 to December 2009 time period, and on remand the
attorney fees awarded should be adjusted accordingly. Because we reverse the restitution order
as to the award of attorney fees concerning the restitution hearings and remand the case, we do
not address Hurles' contention that these fees are unreasonable.

III.
CONCLUSION

We reverse the restitution order as to the award of restitution for embezzlement losses
and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

At the time the

accountant-client privilege was asserted, the accountant was not asked to disclose information
protected by the privilege. We further conclude that the district court, on remand, may only
award restitution for the December 2008 to December 2009 time period.
We reverse the award of restitution for attorney fees concerning the accountant and the
accountant's firm and concerning the bank.

Attorney fees for a legal action against the

accountant, the accountant's firm, and the business's bank are not awardable as restitution.
We reverse the award of restitution for attorney fees concerning the restitution hearing
and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The attorney fees concerning
the restitution hearing were necessary to recover the embezzlement. However, such restitution is
limited to the December 2008 to December 2009 time period.
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We
proceeding. The d

the award of restitution for attorney fees concerning the bankruptcy
court

awarding attorney fees

not abuse its

an adversary complaint made necessary as a result

bankruptcy.

As such, the restitution order is reversed in part and affirmed in part. We remand the

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
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